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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
CLYDE E. HARVEY,
Plaintiff,
vs.

OWEN L. SANDERS, et al.,
Defendants,
KENNETH E. COOMBS, LYNN H.
COOMBS, GROW WEST NO. 2, and
HUNTINGTON PARK, INC.,
Third-Party Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Case No.
13731

vs.

ALBERT W. HORMAN, d/b/a A.
HORMAN & CO.,
Third-Party Defendant-Respondent.
APPELLANTS' BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff sued to foreclose a Uniform Real Estate
Contraot as a note and mortgage. One of the defendant
"mortgagors" purchased the property at Sheriff's sale
and later deeded the property to respondent. Appellant
joined respondent in a third-party action to have his deed
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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declared null and void because of the prior recorded interests of appellant in the property.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Upon resondent's motion to dismiss the third-party
complaint, prior to the filing of any answer or other pleading or the taking of any evidence, the lower court considered the motion as one for summary judgment and
granted summary judgment dismissing the third-party
complaint with prejudice.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek to have the summary judgment dismissing their third^party complaint reversed requiring
respondent to file an answer thus bringing the case to
issue on the merits or, in the alternative, allowing appellants to file an amended third-party complaint alleging
actual notice to respondent of appellants' interest in the
property.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 1, 1959, Harold S. Armstrong and his wife
executed a Uniform Real Etate Contract (hereinafter
Contract "A") to sell certain property in Salt Lake
County to Owen L. Sanders (R. 10-11). This contract
was recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office
on February 7,1964. Title to the property and the sellers'
interest in Contract "A" was conveyed and assigned to
Fred A. Newberger and his wife on January 31, 1968,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
and further conveyed and assigned by the Newbergers
to Clyde E. Harvey and his wife, the plaintiffs in this
action, on March 4, 1968. The buyer's interest in Contract "A" was assigned by Sanders to Beehive Investment Company on June 30, 1959. Beehive then entered
into a separate Uniform Real Estate Contract (hereinafter Contract "B") to sell the same property, on different terms, to Kenneth E. Coombs and Lynn H. Coombs,
the third-party plaintiffs and appellants in this action,
on February 28, 1962. Contract "B" was also recorded
in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office on February
7, 1964 (R. 47). Subsequently, on June 29, 1967, the
buyer's interest in Contract "A" and the seller's interest
in Contract "B" were assigned by Beehive to Intermountain Capital Corporation (R. 45-48, 65-68).
There were other assignments and transactions concerning this property not relevant to this appeal. The
results of all of the above transactions left Harveys holding title to the property subject to Contract "A", by
which Harveys were selling the property to Intermountain Capital Corporation, and further subject to Contract
"B", by which Intermountain Capital Corporation was
reselling the property to the Coombs.
Intermountain failed to make the payments due under Contract "A" and Harveys declared the balance owing
to be due and payable, elected to treat the contract as
a note and mortgage and sued to foreclose (R. 1-15).
Intermountain and the Coombs, as well as others, were
named as defendants. Intermountain filed a cross-corn
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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plaint against the Coombs alleging a default under Contract "B" and praying for the court to adjudge Intermountain "released from all obligations in law and equity
to convey said property" to the Coombs, that all payments made by the Coombs be forfeited as liquidated
damages for non-performance of the contract, and that,
"if and upon plaintiffs herein being satisfied," Intermountain "be permitted to re-enter and take possession
of said premises" (R. 32). The Coombs filed an answer
to the cross-complaint denying any default under Contract "B", raising some affirmative defenses and claiming
that Intermountain was "obligated to provide good title
to the property to these defendants," had defaulted in
its payments under Contract "A", which was therefore
being foreclosed, and was therefore unable to provide good
title to the property to these defendants (R. 34-36).
On July 3, 1968, pursuant to plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment, a Decree of Foreclosure was entered
by which judgment for the balance due was entered
against Intermountain and in favor of Harveys, Contract
"A" was foreclosed as a mortgage, and the property ordered sold at Sheriff's sale to satisfy the judgment (R.
59-63), The cross-complaint of Intermountain against
the Coombs was not disposed of because it involved issues
of fact which were in dispute. The decree provided, however, that the interest of the defendants, including the
Coombs, not be barred and foreclosed until "after the
expiration of the period of redemption as provided by
law" (R. 61).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Sheriff's sale was held on August 6, 1968, and
the property was sold by the Sheriff to Intermountain,
the defendant against whom the judgment was entered
(R. 83). Since that time Intermountain has not taken
any further action to have the court consider its claims
set forth in its cross-complaint against the Coombs and
those claims remain undisposed of by the court. In July
of 1969 the Coomibs were informed that Intermountain
did not recognize any obligation to the Coombs under
Contract "B". Fearing that Intermountain might attempt to dispose of the property without recognizing
their interests, the Coombs caused a Notice of Lis Pendens to be filed with the Salt Lake County Recorder, on
July 30, 1969, giving notice of the pending cross-claims
between Intermountain and the Coombs and of the interest of the Coombs in the property (R. 98, 100). In
spite of the recorded Notice of Lis Pendens, and in spite
of the recorded Contract "B" between Intermountain
and the Coombs (R. 47), Intermountain cnnveyed the
property to A. Herman and Company, the third-party
defendant herein, by a warranty deed bearing the date
of July 14, 1969, but not recorded until August 7, 1969
(R. 98, 101).
Thereafter, on February 22, 1974, the Coombs, after
motion and order by the court, filed a third-party complaint against Albert W. Horman, d/b/a A. Herman and
Company, alleging the above facts and thiat the crossclaims between Intermountain and the Coombs had not
been determined, and praying that Intermountain be
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ordered to convey title to the property to the Coombs,
upon determination and payment of the balance due under Contract "B", and that the warranty deed to Herman
be declared null and void (R. 97-102). Herman filed a
motion to dismiss the third-party complaint claiming
only that it "fails to state a claim on which relief can
be granted." At the hearing on the motion to dismiss the
lower court, on its own initiative, considered the motion
as a motion for summary judgment and continued the
hearing for two weeks, at which time the Coombs would
be allowed to present additional matter pertinent to a
motion for summary judgment (R. 121, 122). The
Coombs' attorney strenuously objected to this procedure
but filed an affidavit indicating that Intermountain had
received and accepted substantial payments under Contract "B" after the Sheriff's sale in August, 1968 and
boitih prior and subsequent to the deed to Herman in
1969 (R. 123). The court, nevertheless, entered summary
judgment dismissing the third^party complaint with prejudice (R. 139).
ARGUMENT
Appellants contend that the lower court erred procedurally in dismissing the third-party complaint, in treating respondents' motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, and in failing to allow appellants to
amend their third-party complaint. Appellants further
contend that the lower court ignored the substantive law
as to the effect of prior recorded interests and the effect
of purchase at a Sheriff's sale by the "mortgagor".
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT'S TREATMENT OF
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AS
A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
WAS CONTRARY TO THE RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE BECAUSE NO INFORMATION OUTSIDE THE PLEADINGS WAS
PRESENTED AND GENUINE ISSUES OF
MATERIAL FACT REMAIN UNRESOLVED.
Horman's motion to dismiss was grounded upon the
sole contention that the third-party complaint "fails to
state a claim on which relief can be granted." This motion assumes the truth of all allegations of fact in the
third-party complaint and calls only for an examination
of the complaint to determine if it states a cause of
action. The motion should not be granted unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled
to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved
in support of the claim. Christensen v. Lelis Automatic
Transmission Service, Inc., 24 U. 2d 165, 467 P. 2d 605
(1970).
Rule 12 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does
provide that on a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted, if "matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by
the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary
judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and
all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to preDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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sent all material made pertinent to such a motion by
Rule 56." However, neither party presented any matters
outside the pleading to the court. Yet, the court, on its
own, told the third^party plaintiff to present its evidence
within two weeks or a summary judgment would be
granted! This was prior to the filing of an answer, prior
to the raising of any issues and prior to any opportunity
for discovery. This procedure would require a party to
be completely ready for trial at the time he files his complaint!
This court has recently held this procedure to be
reversible error. In Hill v. Grand Central, Inc., 25 U. 2d
121, 477 P. 2d 150 (1970), the plaintiff filed a complaint
for libel alleging malice on the part of defendant. The
defendant, without answering, moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. The court denied the motion but gave the
plaintiff thirty days to produce evidence of malice and
stated that, upon plaintiff's failure to do so, summary
judgment would be granted. The plaintiff filed an affidavit and served interrogatories and the defendant filed
a motion for summary judgment, which was granted by
the court. On appeal this court reversed stating:
" . . . we do not think it is proper for a court to
require a plaintiff to state what proof he will
produce on an issue which has not even been
raised.
"True it is that when a motion to dismiss
is accompanied by affidavits it may be treated
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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as a motion for summary judgment, yet the
court should not on his own initiative try to
convert a motion for dismissal into one for summary judgment. H e has no more right to ask
the plaintiff how he will establish his claim than
he has to require the defendant to state what
its defense will be. I t would have been highly
improper for the court, on the motion to dismiss, to have given the defendant 30 days to
present proof as to the truth of the alleged
statement or as to the lack of malice. (Emphasis supplied.)
••• •

"Summary judgment is never used to determine what the facts are, but only to ascertain whether there are any material issues of
fact in dispute. If there be any such disputed
issues of fact, they cannot be resolved by summary judgment even when the parties properly bring the motion before the court/' (Emphasis in original.)
The holding in Hill should dispose of the case now
before the court without further argument. It could hardly be more in point. Based upon the facts alleged in appellants' third-party complaint, which must be accepted as
true at this stage of the proceedings, the legal sufficiency
of appellants' cause of action will be established in Points
II and III.
POINT II.
THE PURCHASE AT THE SHERIFF'S SALE
BY INTERMOUNTAIN CAPITAL CORPO-
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RATION TERMINATED THE FORECLOSURE ACTION AND LEFT ALL PARTIES,
EXCEPT THE "MORTGAGEE," WHERE
THEY WERE PRIOR TO THE FORECLOSURE ACTION. THE CONTRACT OF INTERMOUNTAIN TO CONVEY TITLE TO
THE PROPERTY TO THE COOMBS IS
THEREFORE STILL IN FORCE.
When the Harveys sued to foreclose Contract "A"
as a note and mortgage, the law with respect to foreclosure of mortgages became applicable. The Harveys
became the "mortgagees" and Intermountain became the
"mortgagor" and the judgment debtor in the terms of
the applicable statutes and rules. The Coombs, not being
personally liable to the Harveys under Contract "A", but
having a recorded interest and being a necessary party
to the action, stood in the position of a second mortgagee
or a judgment creditor. Section 78-37-1, U. C. A., provides that ". . . judgment shall be given . . . directing the
sheriff to proceed and sell the (mortgaged property)
according to the provisions of law relating to sales on
execution . . ." Section 78-37-6, U. C. A., provides that
"sales of real estate under judgments of foreclosure of
mortgages and liens are subject to redemption as in cases
of sales under executions generally." The provisions of
Rule 69(e) and (f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, are
therefore applicable to the Sheriff's sale of the property
involved in this proceeding.
There is no provision in the rule which directly states
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the effect of the purchase at the Sheriff's sale by the
mortgagor. However, the only relevant provisions of the
rule are as follows:
Rule 69(e)(6)
"Upon a sale of real property the officer shall
give to the purchaser a certificate of sale, containing: . . . (4) a statement to the effect that
all right, title, interest and claim of the judgment debtor in and to the property is conveyed
to the purchaser . . . . The real property sold
shall be subject to redemption
"
Rule 69(f) (5)
". . . . If the judgment debtor redeems, the effect of the sale is terminated and lie is restored
to his e s t a t e . . . . "
Appellants have searched unsuccessfully for a case
in the State of Utah dealing with the effect of a mortgagor's purchase at a Sheriff's sale. However, the case of
Tanner v. Lawler, 6 U. 2d 84, 305 P. 2d 882 (1957), affd
on rehearing, 6 U. 2d 268, 311 P. 2d 791 (1957), clearly
states the effect of a redemption by a mortgagor. The
court on rehearing stated:
"Under the above provisions of Rule 69 (f) (5)
had Reichert redeemed from the Sheriff's sale
as a judgment debtor and as a successor of the
interest of the Lawlers, the effect of the foreclosure sale would have terminated. I n that
case he would have been the owner of the propDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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erty free from the mortgage which had been
foreclosed and paid off by the sale and redemption, but the subsequent liens and other
interests in the property, including the Clowes
judgment lien, would have been restored the
same as if no foreclosure sale had occurred, and
the rights of subsequent redemptioners would
have been terminated/' (Emphasis supplied.)
In the Tanner case the mortgagee was the purchaser
at the Sheriff's sale and the mortgagor deliberately did
not redeem by paying his money to the Sheriff, as required by Rule 69 (f) (2), U. R. C. P. Instead he took
an assignment of the certificate of sale from the mortgagee and paid a negotiated price therefor directly to
the mortgagee.
It should be remembered that the "mortgagor," Intermountain, did not redeem the property from the purchaser at the Sheriff's sale. It submitted the highest bid
at the sale and therefore was the purchaser. No redemption, as such was involved. What then is the effect upon
the foreclosure action and upon all other parties to the
action claiming liens or interests in the property? Logic
and fairness suggest that the effect should be the same
as when the mortgagor or judgment debtor redeems, that
is, "the sale is terminated and he is restored to his estate," along with "the subsequent liens and other interests in the property . . . the same as if no foreclosure sale
had occurred." Rule 69(f)(5) and Tanner v. Lawler,
supra. Otherwise, a judgment debtor could bar the claims
of all his creditors holding junior liens against his propDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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erty by allowing the first mortgage-holder to foreclose and
purchase the property at the Sheriff's sale.
One searches almost in vain for cases which deal
directly with this question — perhaps because the answer
is so obvious and is rarely questioned. However, if one
goes back far enough, the cases state the law to be elementary that the purchase at a mortgage foreclosure sale
by the mortgagor or judgment debtor terminates the
effect of the foreclosure and reinstates all subsequent
liens and other interests in the property. One of the most
recent cases dealing with the question is Gerken v. Davidson Grocery Co., 50 Idaho 315, 296 Pac. 192 (1931). In
that case Gerken took title to property and assumed three
mortgages thereon. Later the second mortgage foreclosed
and Gerken, the mortgagor, purchased the property at
the foreclosure sale. Still later the third mortgage foreclosed and purchased the property at the sale. Gerken's
wife sued to quiet title against the third mortgagee claiming that since the third mortgagee failed to redeem in
the first foreclosure action, its rights were barred. The
court held otherwise, stating:
"After a foreclosure sale, subsequent
equities are binding on the purchaser's title
where the mortgagor himself becomes the purchaser and the equities were placed there by
himself. 42 C.J. 256 Par. 1905; Jones on
Mortgages (8th Ed.) vol. 3, Par. 2429. Having constructive notice of appellants' mortgage
at the time he took the quitclaim deed, and not
having contested the Davidson Grocery Com-
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pany's mortgage in its foreclosure, to which
proceeding he was a party, Gerken could no
more have evaded that subsequent equity than
could his grantors; he could not keep the land
and at the same time gainsay the burden. I n
effect, all he had done was to clear the land of
the Heiss mortgage; appellants' mortgage remained unaffected."
The Gerken case cited Landau v. Cottrill, 159 Mo.
308, 60 S. W. 64 (1900), in which Cottrill took title subject to a trust deed and then purchased the property at
a Sheriff's sale upon foreclosure of a mechanics lien. The
court held the medianics Uen to be junior to the torust
deed but stated that even if the mechanics hen had priority, purchase at the sale by Cottrill would not bar the
trust deed. In Beitel v. Dobbin, 44 S. W. 299 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1898), one Hoefling took title to property subject
to two mortgages. He purchased the property ait the
Sheriff's sale upon foreclosure of the first mortgage. The
sale was held to be invalid because it was held in the
wrong county but the court stated:
" I t is elementary that a purchaser of
property, who agrees, as a part of the consideration, to pay off two mortgages upon it, cannot suffer a sale to take place under the prior
one, and, without discharging the junior mortgage, claim title against it. Jones, Mortg. §
740; Buke v. Abbott, (Ind. Sup.) 1 N . E . 485;
Conner v. How, (Minn.) 29 N.W. 316; Aliison v. Armstrong, 9 N . W . 806; Mawfield v.
Willey, (Mich.) 9 N . W . 271. Under this prin-
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ciple, Hoefling could not, were the sale under
the deed of trust valid, avoid his agreement to
discharge appellants' mortgage."
There are numerous cases which hold that the reacquisition of title by a mortgagor, after foreclosure of a
first mortgage, inures to the benefit of junior mortgageholders whether the property is purchased by the mortgagor at the foreclosure sale or later acquired by the
mortgagor from the purchaser at the sale. See Annotation, Reacquisition by mortgagor, or his grantee, of the
title through foreclosure of first mortgage as affecting
rights under a second mortgage to which the property
was subject before the foreclosure, 111 A. L. R. 1285. Some
of these cases are based upon estoppel, some are based
upon covenants in the mortgage against encumbrances,
and some are based upon statutes providing that title
acquired after the execution of the mortgage inures to
the benefit of the mortgagee.
All three of these grounds exist in the instant case.
Fairness and equity require that a mortgagor not be
allowed to avoid his obligation to junior lien-holders by
purchasing at the foreclosure sale. Contract "B" contains
covenants by Intermountain against encumbrances and
guarantees the delivery of good title. By the terms of
Contract "B" Intermountain was obligated to buy at the
Sheriff's sale, or redeem, to protect the title which it had
agreed to convey to the Coombs (R. 12-13, Par. 19). And
Utah has an after-acquired title statute, § 57-1-10, U. C. A.,
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which applies to "every instrument in writing by which
any real estate, or interest in real estate, is created,
aliened, mortgaged, encumbered, or assigned . . . " § 571-1, U. C. A. This language certainly covers Contract "B"
and therefore, by statute, the acquisition of title to the
property by Intermountain at the foreclosure sale inures
to the benefit of the Coombs.
One further reason exists for appellants' contention.
If the interests of the Coombs were not reinstated by
Intermountain's purchase at the Sheriff's sale, they would
be barred absolutely except for redemption rights. In
order to redeem from Intermountain the Coombs would
have been required to pay the amount owed by Intermountain to the Harveys, plus interest, costs and attorneys fees, plus the entire amount due from the Coombs
to Intermountain under Contract "B", Rule 69(f) (3),
U. R. C. P., even though it was not yet payable under
the terms of Contract "B" and even though the amount
payable is in dispute since it is the subject of the crosscomplaint filed by Intermountain (R. 31). The Coombs
would thereby be forced to give up their claims, which
are properly in litigation, and forego the payment schedule in Contract "B", and immediately pay any amount
demanded by Intermountain. That is why the law provides for termination of the foreclosure upon redemption,
or direct purchase, by the debtor, thereby terminating
the redemption rights of others. Redemption by the
mortgagor, or purchase at the sale directly by the mortgagor, places all of these parties back where they were.
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The only change is that the foreclosed senior mortgage
has been satisfied by payment at the sale.
POINT III.

HORMAN TOOK TITLE TO THE PROPERTY SUBJECT TO THE RIGHTS OF ALL
PARTIES WITH RECORDED INTERESTS.
THE RECORDED CONTRACT "B" AND
THE RECORDED LIS PENDENS BOTH
GAVE NOTICE TO HORMAN OF THE INTEREST OF THE COOMBS.
The contract between Intermountain and the
Coombs, Contract "B", was recorded in the Salt Lake
County Recorder's Office on February 7, 1964 (R. 47).
The deed from Intermountain to Herman was not recorded until August 7, 1969 (R. 98, 101). The law as to
priority of recorded documents is therefore applicable
here. Section 57-1-6, U. C. A., provides:
"Every conveyance of real estate, and
every instrument of writing setting forth an
agreement to convey any real estate or whereby
any real estate may be affected, to operate as
notice to third persons shall be . . . recorded
in the office of the recorder of the county in
which such real estate is situated, but shall be
valid and binding between the parties thereto
without such . . . record, and as to all other
persons who have had actual notice . . . ."
Section 57-3-2, U. C. A., provides:
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"Every conveyance, or instrument in writing affecting real estate . . . shall, from the
time of filing the same with the recorder for
record, impart notice to all persons of the contents thereof; and subsequent purchasers,
mortgagees and lien holders shall be deemed to
purchase and take with notice."
And Section 57-3-3, U. C. A., provides:
"Every conveyance of real estate hereafter made, which shall not be recorded as provided in this title, shall be void as against any
subsequent purchaser in good faith and for a
valuable consideration of the same real estate,
or any portion thereof, where his own conveyance shall be first duly recorded."
That a recorded notice of contract (the contract
itself was not recorded) takes priority over a subsequently
recorded deed is the holding of the recent case of Wilson
v. Schneitefs Riverside Golf Course,
U. 2d
, 523
P. 2d 1226 (1974). There, two contracts contained overlapping descriptions. The first contract was not recorded
but a notice of the later contract was recorded prior to
the deed given pursuant to the first contract. The court
stated:
"Plaintiffs having recorded their notice of
purchase prior to the recording of the defendant's deed the defendant becomes the subsequent purchaser and is deemed to take with
notice of the plaintiffs' interest."
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Under these authorities Horman, in the instant case,
clearly had notice of the Coombs' interest in the property
and took his deed subject to their interest. Furthermore,
the notice of lis pendens was recorded on July 30, 1969,
eight days prior to the recording of Horman's deed. The
notice of lis pendens was recorded, not because it was
required to be recorded under the statutes, but because
it was feared that someone might overlook the recorded
Contract "B" because of the foreclosure of Contract "A"
and not understand the effect of the purchase at the
Sheriff's sale by Intermountain, as set forth in Pbint II
above. That notice of lis pendens expressly referred to
the pending cross-claims between Intermountain and the
Coombs and stated that the interest of the Coombs "in
said property were reinstated by the purchase of said
property at Sheriff's sale by Intermountain Capital Corporation of Utah" (R. 100).
Such a notice cannot be ignored by Horman, or any
other party dealing with the property. In Crompton v.
Jenson, 78 Utah 55,1 P. 2d 242 (1931), it is stated that:
"One who deals with real property is charged
with notice of what is shown by the records of
the county recorder of the county in which the
property is situated."
The doctrine of lis pendens is a common law concept
providing that ". . . whoever purchases or acquires an
interest in property that is involved in pending litigation
stands in the same position as his vendor, is charged with
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notice of the rights of his vendor's antagonist, and takes
the property subject to whatever judgment may be rendered in the litigation. In other words, a person who
deals with property while it is in litigation does so at
his peril." 51 Am. Jur. 2d Lis Pendens § 1. Most states,
including Utah, have enacted statutes providing for the
filing of a notice of pendency of an action, since at common law the filing of a notice was not required. The
Utah statute is found in § 78-40-2, U. C. A.:
"If (sic) any action affecting the title to,
or the right of possession of real property the
plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint or
thereafter, and the defendant at the time of
filing his answer when affirmative relief is
claimed in such answer, or at any time afterwardy may file for record with the recorder of
the county in which the property or some part
thereof is situated a notice of the pendency of
the action, containing the names of the parties,
the object of the action or defense, and a description of the property in that county affected thereby. From the time of filing such
notice for record only shall a purchaser or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby
be deemed to have constructive notice of the
pendency of the action, and only of its
pendency against parties designated by their
real names." (Emphasis supplied)
This doctrine, as it prevails in the State of Utah, has
been further explained in Dupee v. Salt Lake Valley loan
& Trust Co., 20 Utah 103, 57 Pac. 845, 847 (1899), which
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holds that a purchaser at a foreclosure sale must take
notice of the terms of the decree pursuant to which the
sale occurs. The court stated:
"When the foreclosure suit was commenced a lis pendens was filed. The defendants
and their attorneys knew of and had actual
notice of the pendency of the action, and the
subsequent rendition of the decree, and that
the mortgage lien was still upon the land. The
object of lis pendens is to keep the subject of
the suit, or res, within the power and control
of the court until the judgment or decree shall
be entered so that courts can give effect to their
judgments, and that the public shall have notice
of the pendency of the action. Lis pendens may
be defined to be the jurisditcion, power, or
control which courts acquire over property involved in a suit pending the continuance of
the action, and until its final judgment therein.
This constructive notice of filing the complaint as required by the statute is equivalent
to actual notice."
These authorities should make it clear that Horman
took his deed subject to the interest of the Coombs, notice
of which was on file in the County Recorder's office prior
to the recording of his deed. The fact that Horman's
deed bears the date of July 14, 1969, a date prior to the
recording of the lis pendens, does not change the situation. The recording statutes quoted above are designed
to give priority to the party who first records his document and make a prior unrecorded conveyance void as
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to innocent third parties who first record their own document. See § 57-3-3, U. C. A., supra, and Wilson v. Schneitefs Riversidle Golf Course, supra, where the earlier unrecorded contract was void as to the buyer under a later
contract, notice of which was recorded prior to the recording of the deed given pursuant to the earlier contract.
There is also substantial other authority for the rule that
deeds and instruments made prior to a notice of lis pendens, but not recorded until after the notice of lis pendens, are subject to the notice of lis pendens. Jones v.
Jones, 249 Miss. 322, 161 So. 2d 640 (1964); Munger v.
Beard, 79 Neb. 764, 113 N. W. 214 (1907), upholding
constitutionality of a statute imposing effects of lis pendens on persons holding unrecorded interests; Collingwood v. Brown, 106 N. C. 362,10 S, E. 868 (1890), which
holds an unrecorded interest subject to a suit even though
no notice of lis pendens was filed as required by statute
because "all persons are supposed to be attentive to
what passes in courts of justice" in the county where
the property is situated. That court further stated that
if "owners will omit to record their deeds, and will keep
their titles concealed, hoping thereby to bring others into
difficulty and peril, it is time they were made to understand that the blow intended for the title of another may
recoil upon, and break and destroy, their own."
The recorded Contract "B" and the recorded lis
pendens both adequately notified Horman of the interest
and claims of the Coombs. True, those claims are in litigation, having been placed in litigation by Herman's
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grantor, Intermountain. But the Coombs deserve to have
those claims adjudicated before their interest in the property is defeated. Their third-party complaint seeks only
to join Horman as a party and make his deed to the
property subject to the decree of the court as to the merits of the claims between Intermountain and the Coombs.
POINT IV.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT
W I T H PREJUDICE.
APPELLANTS
SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO
AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT TO ALLEGE
ACTUAL NOTICE TO HORMAN OF THE
I N T E R E S T A N D C L A I M S OF THE
COOMBS.
No opportunity was afforded to appellants to amend
the third-party complaint, as is the usual practice. The
lower court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Appellants contend that the complaint was sufficient as it
stands, and rely fully upon their contentions under Points
I, II & III, above, but, at the very least, an amendment
should have been permitted to allege the actual knowledge of Horman of the interest and claims of the Coombs.
The statutes and cases cited above make the cons>tructive
notice of the recorded Contract "B" and the recorded
lis pendens sufficient to subject Horman's deed to the
Coombs' interest. However, there is additional authority
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which requires a party with actual notice of an adverse
claim to take subject to that claim.
Section 57-1-6, U. C. A., supra, expressly makes an
instrument affecting real estate binding upon "persons
who have had actual notice," and § 57-3-3, U. C. A., supra,
invalidates prior unrecorded interests only as against subsequent purchasers "in good faith." In Whittaker v.
Greenwood, 17 Utah 33, 53 Pac. 736 (1898), the plaintiff
contended that he was not bound by a decree in a previous action because no notice of lis pendens was filed. The
court held otherwise and stated that under the lis pendens statute:
". . . notice of lis pendens may be filed with the
county recorder. The object of this statute
was to provide a mode for giving constructive
notice which was formerly given by the commencement of the action itself. I t does not in
any way change the rule of law relating to
actual notice of the pendency of the action, nor
the effect of such actual notice upon parties
dealing with or obtaining possession or title
to the land in litigation. I n this case it appears
that . . . plaintiff . . . had actual notice, and
was not in a position to object if the statutory
notice had not been filed, the filing of which
was intended only to give him the notice which
he had already or afterwards acquired before
purchase."
The position of this court in the Whittaker case was
reaffirmed in Meagher v. Equity Oil Company, 5 U. 2d
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196, 299 P. 2d 827 (1956). That a purchaser of land takes
title subject to the claims of others of which he has notice
was also the holding of National Realty Sales v. Ewing,
55 Utah 438,186 Pac. 1103 (1920), where the court stated:
" . . . a subsequent purchaser cannot be protected as a bona fide purchaser if he had actual
or constructive notice of an unrecorded title,
ownership, or interest in the property at any
time before payment of the purchase price."
In addition the case of Dupee v. Salt Lake Valley
Loan & Trust Co., supra, relied upon the actual knowledge of the defendants as well as the constructive notice
of a Us pendens in holding the defendants' title subject
to the plaintiff's claim.
While the constructive notice of the recorded documents should be sufficient to subject Horman's deed to
the interest of the Coombs, the Coombs should be allowed to plead and prove the actual knowledge of Horman which deprives him of "good faith" purchaser status.
The law is clear that he is subject to all claims of which
he has actual notice.
CONCLUSION
It should be clear from the statutes, cases and other
authorities cited above that the lower court erred in entering summary judgment against the Coombs. The
court's demand for proof, "or else," before an answer is
filed and any issues raised was improper procedure under
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the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The lower court further overlooked the law which provides that the purchase
at Sheriff's sale by the mortgagor reinstates the claims
and interests of all junior lien-holders. The lower court
further overlooked the statutes and cases granting priority to recorded interests over those whose interests are
later recorded and subjecting property purchasers to the
interests of those whose claims are in litigation when
notice thereof, either constructive or actual, has been
given.
Therefore, this court should reverse the summary
judgment entered below and order that the deed to Horman be subjected to the outcome of the pending litigation between Intermountain and the Coombs.
Respectfully submitted,
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH
Ralph J. Marsh
Attorney for Appellants
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